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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PATRICK LEE CARNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 48355-2020
Bonneville County Case No.
CR10-19-5953

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Patrick Lee Carney failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction upon his conviction for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine)?
ARGUMENT
Carney Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Carney was stopped by the Idaho State Police traveling on I-15 in a vehicle that was

reported stolen. (PSI, p.1.) During a subsequent inventory search of the vehicle, officers found
“multiple glass meth pipes, a prescription bottle containing meth, a syringe with a clear liquid[,]”
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and Carney admitted that he knew about the methamphetamine. (Id.) The state charged Carney
with grand theft by receiving, possessing, or disposing of stolen property, and possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine). (R., pp.51-52.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Carney
pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine and the grand theft charge was dismissed. (R.,
pp.76-79, 110-111; see generally 11/19/19 Tr.) During sentencing, the state recommended a fiveyear sentence, with two years fixed, and a rider. (8/26/20 Tr., p.13, L.25 – p.14, L.2.) Carney’s
attorney recommended a unified sentence of three and one-half years, and that Carney be placed
on three years’ probation. (8/26/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.15-23.) The court rejected Carney’s request for
probation and imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.112-116; 8/26/20 Tr., p.19, Ls.4-22.) Several months later, the district court
held a rider review hearing and placed Carney on probation. (Aug., pp.1-7.) Carney timely
appealed. (R., pp.119-122.)
On appeal, Carney asserts the district court “abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence under any reasonable view of the facts[,]” and specifically contends the court “should
have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment or probation in light of the mitigating factors,
including his commitment to sobriety and acceptance of responsibility.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
Carney has failed to show an abuse of discretion. The sentence imposed was reasonable.
B.

Standard Of Review
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007).
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C.

Carney Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven

years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. “A sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323,
324 (1982)). Furthermore, where a sentence fits within statutory limits, the appellant bears the
burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (citations omitted). To carry this
burden the appellant must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.
Id. To establish that the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736,
170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007).
A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or
retribution. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citation omitted). The district court has
the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when deciding upon the
sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998)
(holding district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of punishment,
deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In deference to the
trial judge, [the appellate court] will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146
Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).
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Carney concedes that his sentence “does not exceed the statutory maximum.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.3.)

Possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) is punishable by

imprisonment for not more than seven years. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). In this case, the district court
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.112-116.) Because the
sentence imposed fits within the statutory limits, Carney “must show that the sentence, in light of
the governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002). He cannot do so.
The sentence imposed was reasonable.

In fashioning Carney’s sentence, the court

reviewed the PSI materials and considered the necessary sentencing factors. (8/26/20 Tr., p.18,
Ls.6-16.) The PSI revealed that Carney has an extensive criminal history comprised of two prior
felony convictions (possession of a controlled substance in 2007, and attempt to elude in 2015),
and at least 30 misdemeanor convictions, and further summarized:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Convicted of Possession of Controlled Substance February 2012; parole
violation and sent to prison
Associated with Sureno gang during incarceration; received several warnings
and DORs
Transferred to Idaho Falls CRC in October 2013; received DOR for drug use[;]
Topped his time and released in February 2015
Served a total of 7 years in prison
Since 2015 he has been charged with and/or convicted of several misdemeanor
and felony crimes, including a felony in Oregon
Several pending charges
Pending misdemeanor battery for fighting with an inmate in May 2020
NCIC check shows felony conviction in Oregon with release after time served
IDOC records show numerous verbal and written warnings as well as DORs[.]

(PSI, pp.4, 9-13.) In regard to his criminal history, Carney told the PSI investigator, “I didn’t have
the proper mindset to be serious when I was out [of prison], and I didn’t really think it was such a
big deal to be in prison.” (PSI, p.14.)

The district court viewed Carney’s past criminality

differently than Carney, stating:
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You describe your past as colorful. I rather think it’s kind of depressing. . . . The
definition of insanity is doing the same thing over again and expecting a different
result. And you’ve been through the system so many times. You’ve had access to
programming, you’ve had multiple convictions over time, you’ve spent a lot of time
in in prison, and you’ve been on a retained jurisdiction, and you just keep doing the
same thing again.
(8/26/20 Tr., p.15, L.24 – p.16, L.10.) The court expressly tied Carney’s substantial criminal
history with the need to protect society and to the related goals of rehabilitation, punishment, and
deterrence, concluding “it would be irresponsible of a judge in those circumstances to consider
placing [him] on probation.” (8/26/20 Tr., p.18, L.8 – p.19, L.2.) Additionally, the court had been
advised by the PSI that Carney was assessed by the LSI-R evaluation as a high risk to reoffend.
(PSI, p.14.)
Carney contends his sentence is excessive in light of his commitment to sobriety and
acceptance of responsibility. (Appellant’s brief, p.4.) He is incorrect. The district court properly
weighed any mitigating factors when it imposed Carney’s sentence. The court considered defense
counsel’s sentencing argument as well as Carney’s expression of remorse and willingness to
undergo substance abuse treatment. (8/26/20 Tr., p.7, L.25 – p.8, L.4; p.10, Ls.2-11.) While it is
laudable that Carney accepted responsibility and apologized for the instant offense, his regret for
once again choosing to engage in criminal behavior is outweighed by his failure to be deterred
from such behavior in the past. (See
- - 8/26/20 Tr., p.14, L.17 - p.15, L.15.) In regard to Carney’s
substance abuse problem, the court told him that, with a rider, he had the “opportunity here to have
one more chance at that programming” and that “[w]hether you employ it or not is up to you.”
(8/26/20 Tr., p.19, L.19 – p.20, L.2.)
Even considering the mitigating information Carney cites, the court determined that the
sentence imposed was necessary because it balanced the need to achieve the goals of sentencing
while providing an opportunity for Carney to receive treatment and to demonstrate to the court
5

that he merited a period of probation. (8/26/20 Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.16; p.19, L.19 – p.20,
L.12.) Carney has failed to show that the court did not exercise reason simply because it gave less
weight to the mitigating circumstances than he desired. See State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 773,
229 P.3d 374, 378 (2010) (finding no abuse of discretion upon a weighing of mitigating and
aggravating factors in sentencing); State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969, 974 (2005)
(emphasizing the discretionary nature of weighing mitigating and aggravating factors).
In sum, because the district court properly considered and applied the goals of sentencing
and weighed his past and current criminal behavior against any mitigating information in
fashioning Carney’s underlying sentence, Carney has failed to show that the district court abused
its sentencing discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 14th day of April, 2021.
/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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